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Photo 1: Launch of Shuttle Mission STS-90
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1.0 SUMMARY
A pre-launch debris inspection of the launch pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on
15 April 1998. The detailed walkdown of Pad 3913 and MLP-2 also included the primary flight
elements OV-102 Columbia (25th flight), ET-91 (LWT 84), and BI-094 SRB's. There were no
significant vehicle anomalies.
As a result of tile damage on the STS-86, -87, and -89 Orbiters and subsequent investigation of
foam loss from the ET thrust panels, the ET-91 intertank was modified to remove even more
foam than ET-90 (STS-89). Foam on both -Y and +Y thrust panels was machined/sanded to
arn_mum dra .wing requirements to improve the stress/strain capability without the find, eliminate
er matenal layer, reduce the amount of potential debris material, and reduce the foam height
above the panel ribs to decrease the cross-flow air loading on the foam. All of these measures
were designed to eliminate or reduce the amount of TPS loss from the thrust panels, and in turn
reduce the amount of damage to Orbiter tiles.
The Final Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was performed on 17 April 1998 during the two
hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There were no Launch Commit Criteria (LCC),
OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. No Ice, Debris, or TPS IPR's were taken. Three
debris items were found on the MLP deck directly below the External Tank. A ¾-inch diameter
personnel safety life line was tied between two sound suppression water pipes adjacent to
holddown posts #5 and #7. A white, plastic, heavy duty tie-wrap was on the 8-inch sound
suppression water pipe adjacent to holddown post #1. And a broken drill bit 1-inch long by
¼-inch diameter lay on the MLP deck.
After the 2:19 p.m. (local) launch on 17 April 1998, a debris walk down of Pad 3913 was
performed. No flight hardware or TPS materials were found. All the T-0 umbilicals operated
properly. Both lett and right SRB aft skirt GN2 purge lines were intact alter littoff although the
first layer of protective aluminum tape had eroded away. The remaining two layers probably kept
the steel braid and internal tube from melting, a common failure mode on previous launches.
A 4-foot by 4-foot by 0.25-inch thick steel ventilation hatch from the hammerhead crane machine
room was recovered on the FSS 275 foot level. The hatch, which was observed in high speed
launch films, had shaken loose by the SRB exhaust plume vibration/acoustics. The hatches on
both launch pads have since been welded in place to prevent a reoccurrence. However, the
broader concern for "abandoned in place" equipment is being addressed.
A total of 112 films and videos were analyzed as part of the post mission data review. No vehicle
damage or lost flight hardware was observed that would have affected the mission.
No stud hang-ups were observed on any of the eight holddown posts. No ordnance debris or
frangible nut pieces fell from the DCS/stud holes.
Some of the lacing was loose, or untied, on two adjacent SRB thermal curtains near HDP #4. An
opening in the curtain outer layer appeared momentarily as the curtains deflected from the initial
SRB ignition pressure wave. Immediately afterwards, the curtains resumed the normal hanging
curved shape. No detrimental effect to the inner thermal curtain was detected.
A white object appeared to originate from an area between SSME #2/#3 and fell aft at
18:19:47.730 UTC. Post flight inspection of the Orbiter showed the object was a portion of an
SSME Dome Mounted Heat Shield 0)MHS) closeout blanket
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2.0 PRE-LAUNCH BRIEFING
The Debris/Ice/TPS and Photographic Analysis Team briefing for launch activities was
conducted on 15 April 1998 at 1400 hours. The following personnel participated in various team
activities, assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and contributed to reports contained in
this document.
J. Tatum NASA - KSC
G. Katnik NASA - KSC
R. Speece NASA - KSC
B. Bowen NASA - KSC
J. Rivera NASA - KSC
R. Page NASA - KSC
K. Revay USA - SFOC
J. Blue USA- SFOC
R. Seale USA- SFOC
W. Richards USA- SFOC
M. Wollam USA - SFOC
G. Fales USA - SFOC
T. Ford USA - SFOC
F. Foster BNA - LSS
C. Hill BNA - LSS
M. Eastwood THIO - LSS
S. Otto MMMSS - LSS
J. Ramirez MMMSS - LSS
Chief, ET/SRB Mechanical Systems
Shuttle Ice/Debris Systems
Thermal Protection Systems
Infrared Scanning Systems
ET Mechanisms/Structures
SSP Integration
Supervisor, ET/SRB Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
Systems Integration
Systems Integration
SRM Processing
ET Processing
ET Processing
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TheFinal Inspection Team observed no ice, frost, or condensate on the LO2 tank acreage. TPS
surface temperatures averaged 65 degrees F.
The intertank acreage exhibited no TPS anomalies, including the sanded thrust panels. Ice/frost
accumulation on the base of the GUCP appeared typical.
The Final Inspection Team detected no ice, frost, or condensate on the LR2 tank acreage. TPS
surface temperatures averaged 67 degrees F on the +Z side and 63 degrees F on the -Z side. The
difference between the two sides was attributed to the "thick/thin" TPS configuration.
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated in the LO2 feedline bellows and support
brackets.
A 10-inch long by 3/8-inch wide stress relief crack had formed, as expected, on the -Y vertical
strut forward facing TPS.
There were no TPS anomalies on the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice/frost accumulations were
limited to small patches on the aft and inboard sides. Ice/fi'ost fingers on the separation bolt
pyrotechnic canister purge vents were less than usual.
Ice and frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both burst disks was typical. The LI-I2
feedline bellows were wet with condensate. A 2-inch by 2-inch frost spot had formed at the LH2
feedline-to-ET interface.
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge
barrier outboard side and forward surface. Typical ice/frost fingers were present on the pyro
canister and plate gap purge vents. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared during
tanking, stable replenish, and launch.
3.2.4 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and properly configured for launch.
No leaks occurred on the GUCP or the LO2 and LH2 Orbiter T-0 umbilicals.
Three debris items were found on the MLP deck directly below the External Tank. A ¾-inch
diameter personnel safety life line was tied between two sound suppression water pipes adjacent
to holddown posts #5 and #7. A white, plastic, heavy duty tie-wrap was on the 8-inch sound
suppression water pipe adjacent to holddown post #1. And a broken drill bit 1-inch long by
¼-inch diameter lay on the MLP deck.
3.3 "1"-3HOURS TO LAUNCH
After completion of the Final Inspection on the pad, surveillance continued from the Launch
Control Center. Twenty-two remote controlled television cameras and two infrared radiometers
were utilized to perform scans of the vehicle. No ice or frost on the acreage TPS was detected.
Protuberance icing did not increase noticeably. At T-2:30, the GOX vent seals were deflated and
the GOX vent hood lifted. No ice was detected in the "no ice" zone.
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Photo 2:STS-90 Ready for Launch
OV-102 Columbia (25th flight), ET-91 (LWT 84), and BI-094 SRB's. The Final Inspection
Team observed no ice, frost, or condensate on the LO2 tank acreage. TPS surface temperatures
averaged 65 degrees F.
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Photo 3:LH2 Tank After Cryoload
The Final Inspection Team detected no ice, fi-ost, or condensate on the LH2 tank acreage. TPS
surface temperatures averaged 67 degrees F on the +Z side and 63 degrees F on the -Z side. Note
configuration change to the intertank, which had been machined/sanded.
8
Photo 4: Machined Intertank
Close-up view of the machined foam on intertank stringers. The forward and aft ends of the
stringers retained thicker foam due to the cryogenic interface with the LO2 and LH2 tank
flanges.
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Photo 6: Overall View of SSME's
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Photo 7: Debris Items on MLP Deck
Three debris items were found on the MLP deck directly below the External Tank. A ¾-inch
diameter personnel safety life line was tied between two sound suppression water pipes adjacent
to holddown posts #5 and #7 (above). A white, plastic, heavy duty tie-wrap was on the 8-inch
sound suppression water pipe adjacent to holddown post #1. And a broken drill bit 1-inch long by
1A-inch diameter lay on the MLP deck.
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4.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
The post launch inspection of MLP 2, Pad B FSS, RSS, and pad apron was conducted on
17 April 1998 from Launch + 1 to 3 hours. No flight hardware was found.
No stud hang-ups occurred on this launch. Boeing - Downey reported an Orbiter liftoff lateral
acceleration of 0.12 g's, which is below the threshold (0.14 g's) for stud hang-ups. SRB hold
down post erosion was less than usual. North holddown post blast covers and T-0 umbilicals
exhibited typical exhaust plume damage. Both left and right SRB aft skirt GN2 purge lines were
intact after liftoff. The first layer of protective aluminum tape had eroded away. The remaining
two layers probably kept the steel braid and internal tube from melting, a common failure mode
on previous launches.
The Tail Service Masts (TSM's) appeared undamaged and the bonnets were closed properly.
There was no unusual erosion at the bases of the TSMs where excess grout had been removed.
Likewise, the Orbiter Access Arm (OAA) seemed to be undamaged.
The GH2 vent line was latched in the fourth of eight teeth of the latching mechanism. The GUCP
7-inch QD surface exhibited no scuff marks. All observations indicated a nominal retraction and
latchback, though the GH2 vent line exhibited heat effects/damage from the SRB exhaust plume.
The new haunch lanyard protective "lip" showed no significant damage.
The GOX vent seals were in excellent shape with no indications of plume damage. No topcoat
from the External Tank nose cone adhered to the seals. The east (in the retracted position) flex
duct was disconnected from the hood though the clamp had evidently been relocated by the
initial sating team as it had been placed between the elevator doors.
A 4-foot by 4-foot by 0.25-inch thick steel ventilation hatch from the hammerhead crane
machine room was recovered on the FSS 275 foot level. The hatch, which was observed in high
speed launch films, had shaken loose by the SRB exhaust plume vibration/acoustics. The hatches
on both launch pads have since been welded in place to prevent a reoccurrence. However, the
broader concern for "abandoned in place" equipment is being addressed.
Other post launch debris findings on the MLP were few this launch probably due to the south
winds at T-0. On the FSS, debris was typical and included fasteners, cable trays, signs, and the
lower FIREX paddle from the 195 foot level. Pad apron debris was also minimal and included
fasteners, small pieces of sheet metal from the RSS and a large light fixture on the southwest
comer of the apron.
Overall, damage to the pad appeared to be minimal.
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Photo 8: SRB Aft Skirt GN2 Purge Lines
Both right and left SRB aft skirt GN2 purge lines were intact after liftoff. The first layer of
protective aluminum tape had eroded away. The remaining two layers probably kept the steel
braid and internal tube from melting, a common failure mode on previous launches.
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5.0 FILM REVIEW
Anomalies observed in the Film Review were presented to the Mission Management Team,
Shuttle managers, and vehicle systems engineers. No IPR's or IFA's were generated as a result of
the film review.
5.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
A total of 85 films and videos, which included twenty-eight 16ram films, eighteen 35ram films,
and thirty-nine videos, were reviewed starting on launch day.
SSME ignition appeared normal. Noticeable amounts of free burning hydrogen were blown
under the body flap by the strong southerly winds. One debris-induced streak occurred in the
SSME #1 exhaust plume just after the Mach diamond formed (E-2, -3, -19, -20).
SSME ignition caused numerous pieces of ice from the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical to fall aft along
side the body flap. Two rectangular-appearing, silhouetted objects, most likely pieces of ice from
the LH2 feedline bellows, also fell aft during SSME startup (OTV-109, 163).
Tile surface coating material was lost during ignition from three places on the RH OMS engine
heat shield, two places on the base heat shield outboard of SSME #2, oneplace on the SSME #2
engine mounted heat shield, one place on the SSME #3 engine mounted heat shield, and one
place on the base heat shield between the SSME cluster (E- 17, - 18, - 19, -20, -76, OTV- 150).
There were no stud hang-ups. No ordnance debris or frangible nut pieces fell from the DCS/stud
holes. The north HDP blast covers closed normally. A 7-inch by 3-inch by 1-inch piece of
instafoam broke away from the RH SRB aft skirt aft ring near I-IDP #1 at liftoff (E-8, -9, -20).
Some of the lacing was loose, or untied, on two adjacent SRB thermal curtains near HDP #4. An
opening in the curtain outer layer appeared momentarily as the curtains deflected from the initial
SRB ignition pressure wave. Immediately afterwards, the curtains resumed the normal hanging
curved shape. No detrimental effect to the inner thermal curtain was detected (E-7).
The GN2 purge lines separated cleanly from both SRB aft skirts at liftoff. The purge lines were
visible for about two seconds after T-0 before being obscured from view by smoke and flame
(E-8, -13).
Water leaked from the sound suppression water pipe joint near holddown post #4 (E-7, -10, -15).
Several cameras viewed more than usual amounts of MLP paint flakes/deck scale lifted and
moved by aspiration. No contact with flight hardware was detected.
GUCP disconnect and GH2 vent line retraction from the ET was normal (E-33).
No anomalies were detected on.the External Tank nose cone. No ice was present in the louvers
or "no ice" zone (OTV 113, 160, 162).
Vibration from the SRB exhaust plume caused a white, 4-f0ot by 4-foot by ¼-inch thick metal
ventilation hatch to dislodge from the top of the hammerhead crane machine room (19:18:11.431
UTC), slide down the curved wall, land on the top level of the FSS, fall still farther into the
microwave antenna area (FSS south side), before being obscured from view by smoke. The
vehicle was well clear of the tower and the loose hatch was not a threat to flight hardware (E-62).
Numerous light-colored particles falling along side the SRB exhaust plumes starting at the roll
maneuver (including one large cluster of particles from the RH SRB aft skirt at 15.1 seconds
MET) are believed to be pieces of SRB aft skirt aft ring instafoam (E-57).
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Photo 9: Right SRB Thermal Curtain
Some of the lacing was loose, or untied, on two adjacent SRB thermal curtains near HDP #4. An
opening in the curtain outer layer appeared momentarily as the curtains deflected from the initial
SRB ignition pressure wave. Immediately afterwards, the curtains resumed the normal curved
shape. No detrimental effect to the inner thermal curtain was detected.
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Photo 10: Hammerhead Crane Hatch
Vibration from the SRB exhaust plume caused a 4-foot by 4-foot by ¼-inch thick metal
ventilation hatch to dislodge from the top of the hammerhead crane machine room, slide down
the curved wall, land on the top level of the FSS, fall still farther into the microwave antenna area
(FSS south Side), before being obscured from view by smoke. The vehicle was well clear of the
tower at this point and the loose hatch was not a tbxeat to flight hardware.
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Photo 11: SSME DMHS Blanket Panel
A white object appeared to originate from an area between SSME #2/#3 and fell aft at
18:19:47.730 UTC. Post flight inspection of the Orbiter showed the object had been a portion of
an SSME Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blanket from SSME #1.
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5.2 ON-ORB1T FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
OV-102 was equipped to carry umbilical cameras: 16ram motion picture with 5 mm lens; 16mm
motion picture with 10ram lens; 35ram still views. In addition, the flight crew provided hand-held
still images and video.
LH2 ET/ORB umbilical 16mm cameras
Focus on the 16mm film with 5mm lens was somewhat soft.
SRB separation' from the External Tank appeared nominal. The wide angle ET/ORB LI-I2
umbilical camera provided a view of both SRB forward skirts/frustums/nose caps during
separation. The nose caps, which are not recovered for post flight inspection, appeared to be
intact and in good condition.
Sun illumination of the ET after separation was very good when the Orbiter shadow passed by.
ET-91 separation from the Orbiter' was normal. No venting from the GUCPfmtertank area was
observed in the two 16ram motion picture films. No divots were detected in the LO2 and LI-I2
tank acreage.
Three light, circular areas in the -Y thrust panel adjacent to the intertank stringer splice may be
possible divots. The view of the -Y thrust panel is not very good from this angle (the +Y thrust
panel is not visible at all since the 16ram cameras are located in the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical)
making confirmation of divots difficult.
The +Z side of the intertank appeared to be in good condition. Heating from the shock waves off
both forward EB fittings left black marks on the intertank acreage in a line from the EB fittings to
the bipod spindle housings. These marks have not been so pronounced on previous tanks and may
be more visible due to the sanded foam acreage.
The jack pad standoff closeouts appeared to be intact. A 6-inch diameter divot was centered
between the bipods in the LI-I2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout. Three divots (two 4-6 inches in
diameter and one approximately 10-inches in diameter) were visible in the flange closeout -Y+Z
quadrant along with one 3-inch diameter divot in the +Y+Z quadrant. None of the divots were
deep enough to show primed substrate.
Both +Y and -Y thrust struts exhibited typical ascent erosion and very small divoting.
A divot 4-inches in diameter on the att surface of the -Y vertical strut revealed the underlying
SLA.
No damage was observed on either LH2 or LO2 ET/ORB umbilical.
Crew Hand-held Still Images
One positive transparency roll of thirty-eight images taken by the flight crew after ET separation
from the Orbiter was analyzed with the following results:
One divot, approximately 6-8 inches in diameter, was detected in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange
closeout centered between the bipods. The bipod jack pad standoff closeouts appeared robe
intact.
Three divots, approximately 6-8 inches in diameter, were detected in the -Y+Z quadrant LH2
tank-to-intertank flange closeout between the -Y thrust panel and the -Y bipod.
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5.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
A total of 23 films and videos, which included nine 35mm large format films, two 16ram films,
and twelve videos, were reviewed.
The landing gear extended properly. The infrared scanners showed no debris falling from the
Orbiter during final approach. The main landing gear contacted the runway almost
simultaneously with the left side touching down first. Touchdown of the nose landing gear was
smooth.
Drag chute operation appeared nominal. Rollout and wheel stop were uneventful.
TPS damage on the lower surface of both right and left glove area was visible in some of the
films.
22
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Photo 12: SRB Separation From External Tank
SRB separation from the External TaM( appeared nominal. The wide angle ET/ORB LH2
umbilical camera provided a view of both SRB forward skirts/frustums/nose caps during
separation. The nose caps, which are not recovered for post flight inspection, appeared to be
intact and in good condition. Erosion of foam from the LH2 cable tray was typical. A divot
4-inches in diameter on the aft surface of the -Y vertical strut revealed the underlying SLA.
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Photo 13:LO2 ET/ORB Umbilical
The LO2 ET/ORB umbilical cable tray exhibited typical erosion and divoting. The umbilical
itself was undamaged. A long gash in the +Y thrust strut TPS was most likely caused by a debris
impact. Note small, shallow "popcorn" type divots on the aft dome and LH2 tank acreage - a
typical occurrence. Also note the charring and flaking off of a thin layer of foam from the +Y
upper strut fairing closeout.
24
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Photo 14:LH2 Tank Flange Divots
A divot in the -Y+Z quadrant of the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout was deep enough to
expose substrate. However, the divot on centerline between the bipod struts was shallow. A small
portion of.the +Y thrust panel was visible in this field of view. Very small, shallow areas of TPS
were missing from stringer heads forward of the EB fitting along the thrust panel-to-intertank
splice. The charting and flaking off of thin layers of foam just aft of the nose cone is the same
(acceptable) phenomenon affecting other areas of the tank, such as the aft surface of the vertical
struts.
25
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Photo 15: Intertank
The +Z side of the intertank appeared to be in good condition. Heating flOln the shock waves off
both forward EB fittings left black marks on the intertank acreage in a line from the EB fittings
to the bipod spindle housings. These marks have not been so pronounced on previous tanks and
may be more visible due to the sanded foam acreage. Three divots (two 4-6 inches in diameter
and one apwoximately 10-inches in diameter) were visible in the flange closeout -Y+Z quadrant.
26
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Photo 16: Pre-Launch View of Flange Closeout
A previously repaired area on the flange closeout near the ET centerline between the two bipods
may have been associated with the divot detected in the on-orbit photography.
27
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Photo 17: Thrust Panels
Loss of foam from both thrust panels that caused damage to Orbiter tiles is not readily apparent
in this on-orbit photography. Small, circular, light-colored areas around the EB fittings and along
the thrust panel-to-intertank splices may be divots. The BSM burn scars are typical.
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6.0 SRB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
The BI-094 Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and debris sources at CCAS
Hangar AF on 20 April 1998.
Both frustums were in excellent condition. No TPS was missing and no debonds/unbonds were
detected over fasteners or acreage. Virtually none of the Hypalon paint had blistered or peeled.
All eight BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened position.
The forward skirts exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. RSS antennae covers/phenolic base
plates were intact although one phenolic layer on both +Z side base plates had delaminated.
Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the areas where BTA closeouts had been applied. All
frustum severance ring pins and retainer clips were intact.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were generally in good condition. Trailing
edge damage to the FJPS and the GEI cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from
severance of the nozzle extension.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. TPS on the external surface of both att
skirts was intact and in good condition.
The holddown post Debris Containment Systems (DCS) appeared to have functioned normally.
However, the I-IDP #3 DCS plunger was completely obstructed by a frangible nut half and may
have been the result of water impact. There was no stud hang-up on this launch. A bolt shank on
the I-IDP #1 DCS cover was broken.
Overall, the external condition of the SRB's was excellent.
29
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Photo 18: Frustum Post Flight Condition
Both frustums were in excellent condition. No TPS was missing and no debonds/unbonds were
detected over fasteners or acreage. Virtually none of the Hypalon paint had blistered or peeled.
All eight BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened position.
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Photo 19: Forward Skirt PostFlight Condition
The forward skirts exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. RSS antennae covers/phenolic base
plates were intact though one phenolic layer on both +Z side base plates had delaminated.
Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the areas where BTA closeouts had been applied. All
frustmn severance ring pins and retainer clips were intact.
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Photo 20: Aft Booster/Aft Skirt Post Flight Condition
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. TPS on the external surface of both aft
skirts was intact and in good condition. The holddown post Debris Containment Systems (DCS)
appeared to have functioned normally.
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7.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
After the 12:09 p.m. local/eastern time landing on 3 May 1998, a post landing inspection of
OV-102 Columbia was conducted at the Kennedy Space Center on SLF runway 33 and in the
Orbiter Processing Facility bay #3. This inspection was performed to identify debris impact
damage and, if possible, debris sources.
The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 131 hits, of which 20 had a major dimension of 1-inch or
larger. This total does not include the numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to SSME
vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume recirculation. A comparison of these numbers to statistics
from 71 previous missions of similar configuration (excluding missions STS-23, 24, 25, 26, 26R,
27R, 30, 42, 86, 87, and 89, which had damage from known debris sources), indicates both the
total number of hits and the number of hits 1-inch or larger was close to average (reference
Figures 1-4).
The following table breaks down the STS-90 Orbiter debris damage by area:
HITS > 1" TOTAL HITS
Lower surface 11 76
Upper surface 3 12
Window Area 3 22
Right side 0 0
Left side 1 8
Right OMS Pod 0 5
Left OMS Pod 2 8
TOTALS 20 131
The Orbiter lower surface sustained 76 total hits, of which 11 had a major dimension of 1-inch or
larger. Most of this damage was concentrated aft of the nose to the main landing gear wheel
wells on both left and right chines with most of the damage occurring on the left side. Virtually
no damage occurred on the Orbiter centerline. These damage sites generally follow the same
location pattern documented on STS-86, STS-87, and STS-89. The numbers are slightly less than
the fleet averages for the lower surface (83 total hits with 13 larger than 1-inch) and can be
attributed to the External Tank intertank foam being sanded to a greater degree than the previous
tanks. The sizes and depths of the damage sites were comparable to STS-89:
STS-86 STS-87 STS-89 STS-90 Fleet Average
Lower surface total hits 100 244 95 76 83
Lower surface hits > 1-inch 27 109 38 11 13
Longest damage site 7 in. 15 in. 2.8 in. 3.0 in. N/A
Deepest damage site 0.4 in. 1.5 in. 0.2 in. 0.25 in. N/A
No lower surface tiles were scrapped due to debris damage. The deepest lower surface tile
damage sites (0.25-inches) were located on the left chine and were most likely caused by loss of
foam from the ET -Y thrust panel. The largest lower surface tile damage site was located aft of
the RH main landing gear wheel well. The site measured 4-inches long by 1.25-inches wide by
0.1-inches deep and could have been caused by an impact from the umbilical purge barrier
material or tape flapping in the airstream.
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Figure 1: Orbiter Lower Surface Debris Damage Map
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Figure 3: Orbiter Right Side Debris Damage Map
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24 67 28 81
21 96 33 141
7 66 17 111
24 129 34 183
37 " 177 55 257
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13 60 20 76
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22 111 28 145
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11 47 13 76
24 149 25 164
5 81 9 127
22 175 27 198
17 102 26 147
17 78 21 116
3 23 6 55
11 55 17 96
5 32 15 69
15 48 17 81
5 35 12 85
8 65 11 103
4 34 8 93
14 48 15 100
14 53 18 103
7 38 13 81
10 67 13 103
11 34 12 90
6 37 13 102
AVERAGE 13.3 83.2 19.6 124.3
SIGMA 7ol 43.9 9.5 51.9
._ ..... ..,,, ..,
STS-90 !.! 7(_' 20 "1'31
MISSIONS STS-23,24,25,26,26R,27R,30R,42,86,87 ' AND 89 ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS ANALYSIS
SINCE THESE MISSIONS HAD SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN DEBRIS SOURCES
Photo 21: Landing
After the 12:09 p.m. local/eastern time landing oll 3 May 1998, a post landing inspection of
OV-102 Columbia was conducted at the Kennedy Space Center on SLF runway 33.
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Photo 22: Overall View of Orbiter Sides
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Photo23: Lower Surface Tile Damage
The Orbiter lower surface sustained 76 total hits, of which 11 had a major dimension of 1-inch or
larger. Most of this damage was concentrated aft of the nose to the main landing gear wheel
wells on both left and right chines with most of the damage occurring on the left side. Virtually
no damage occurred on the Orbiter centerline. These damage sites generally follow the same
location pattern documented on STS-86, STS-87, and STS-89. The numbers are slightly less than
the fleet averages for the lower surface (83 total hits with 13 larger than 1-inch) and can be
attributed to the External Tank intertank foam being sanded to a greater degree than the previous
tm_s.
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Photo 24: SSME's/Base Heat Shield
Typical amounts of tile damage occurred on the base heat shield due to exhaust plume acoustics
and recirculation. Generally, the SSME Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blankets
were in excellent condition. However, the blanket panels on SSME #1 at the 7:00 o'clock
position were torn/frayed with missing batting material. This missing material may have been the
white object falling aft of the SSME area during ascent at 47 seconds MET in the launch films.
44
Photo 25:LO2 and LH2 ET/ORB Umbilicals
Note closeout foam and RTV along the edge of the umbilical plate aft of the
17-inch disconnect on the LO2 umbilical (left photo).
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Photo 26: Excess Closeout Foam
An excessive amount of umbilical closeout foam (an "L"-shape 7-inches long by 3 inches on the
perpendicular side) adhered to the umbilical plate aft of the 17-inch disconnect.
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Photo 27: Windows
Hazing and streaking of forward-facing Orbiter windows was moderate to heavy. Damage sites
on the window perimeter tiles was less than usual in quantity and size. The larger damage sites
were attributed to old material falling out and were not included in this assessment.
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STS-90 (OV-102): FILM/VIDEO SCREENING AND TIMING
SUMMARY
SCREENING ACTIVITIES
1.1.1 Launch
The STS-90 launch of Columbia (OV-102) from Pad B occurred on Friday, April
18, 1998 at approximately 108:18:19:00.122 UTC as seen on camera OTV149.
SRB separation occurred at approximately 18:21:05.08 UTC as seen on camera
ET212.
On launch day, 24 of the 24 expected videos were received and screened. No
anomalous events that would affect the Orbiter re-entry and landing were seen.
Twenty launch films were screened on April 21, 1998.
Photography of the left SRB and the LSRB/ET aft attach and the external tank aft
dome was acquired using umbilical well camera films during SRB separation.
Photography of the external tank was acquired during ET separation. Handheld
still photography of the ET was acquired following separation. Also, handheld
video of the ET was acquired.
1.1.2 On-Orbit
No on-orbit tasks were requested.
1.1.3 Landing
Columbia made an early afternoon landing on runway 33 at the KSC Shuttle
Landing Facility on May 3, 1998. Twelve videos and ten films were received.
The landing touch down appeared harder than normal. A sink rate analysis of the
main landing gear was performed (see Section 2.6). The drag chute deployment
appeared normal.
According to the pre-mission agreement, the STS-90 landing film and video was
not screened due to budgetary constraints.
POST LANDING
The time codes from videos and films were used to identify specific events
during the screening process.
The landing and drag chute event times are provided in Table 1.2.
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2. SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
2.1 DEBRIS FROM SSME IGNITION THROUGH LIFTOFF
As on previous missions, numerous light-colored pieces of debris were seen aft
of the launch vehicle before, during, and after the roll maneuver (umbilical ice
debris, RCS paper, SRB flame duct debris, and water baffle debris). On
OTV109 and OTV163, multiple pieces of ice debris were seen falling from the
ET/Orbiter umbilicals during SSME ignition. A piece of ice/frost debris fell aft
and contacted the LH2 umbilical door sill at 18:18:55.764 UTC. No damage to
the door sill was visible.
Figure 2.1 Linear-Shaped Debris
A single light-colored linear-shaped piece of debris (probably umbilical ice) was
seen falling near the LH2 four inch recirculation line at 18:18:59.121 UTC. A
second light-colored linear-shaped piece of debris was seen falling near the ET
aft dome at the same time. On cameras E2 and E5 multiple pieces of light
colored debris (probably SRB throat plug material) were seen near RSRB at SRB
ignition. These debris were not seen to contact the vehicle.
2.2 DEBRIS DURING ASCENT
A light-colored piece of debris was seen between the LSRB and the aft end of the
ET after liftoff on camera OTVI48 (18:19:11.288 UTC). A light-colored flare
(probably debris induced) was visible in the SSME exhaust plume during ascent
(18:19:44.589 UTC) on camera KTV4B.
A light-colored piece of debris, first seen near the center of the three SSMEs,
may have been a piece of Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blanket
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(18:19:47.7 UTC). A single piece of debris near the RSRB stiffener rings
(probably instafoam) fell aft along the SRB exhaust plume (approximately 18.4
seconds MET). A single piece of light-colored debris first seen near the RSRB
aft skirt appeared to travel toward SSME #3 before falling aft into the SSME
exhaust plume (18:19:33.3 UTC). Debris seen near the LSRB aft skirt was seen
falling aft at approximately 30.8 seconds MET. (Cameras E52, E207, E222,
E223, E224.)
2.3
Figure 2.2 Large Light-Colored Debris
MOBILE LAUNCH PLATFORM (MLP) EVENTS
A thin, gray-colored vapor was visible near the inboard portion of the RSRB aft
stiffener ring prior to SRB ignition on camera E4 (18:18:58.532 UTC). The
vapor was probably outgassing, caused by the heat from the SSME engines.
Orange vapor, probably free burning hydrogen, was seen forward of the SSME
rims, forward of the trailing edge of the body flap, and near the base of the
vertical stabilizer during SSME ignition (E2, E5, El7, El8, El9, E52). Orange
vapors drifting forward from the aft end of the vehicle have been observed on
previous missions.
Tile surface coating material erosion was seen during SSME ignition at the base
of SSME #2 and SSME #3, on the base heat shield above SSME#1, on the base
heat shield near the right OMS pod, and at three areas on the base of the right
RCS stinger (E2, E 17, 19, E20).
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Figure 2.3 Flash in SSME #2 Exhaust Plume
A light-colored flash (probably debris induced) was seen in the SSME #2 exhaust
plume at liftoff on OTV151 (18:19:00.488 UTC). The SSME Mach diamonds
appeared to form in the expected sequence as seen on camera El9 and recorded
in Table 2.3. No follow-up action was requested.
SSME TIME (UTC)
SSME #3 18:18:56.738
SSME #2 18:18:56.791
SSME #1 18:18:56.967
Table 2.3 SSME Mach Diamond Formation
2.4 ASCENTEVENTS
Recirculation, or the expansion of burning exhaust gas, was seen at the aft end of
the launch vehicle between 18:20:32.3 and 18:20:38.1 UTC on camera ET204.
Recirculation has been seen on previous missions.
Seven orange-colored flares (probably debris induced) were seen in the SSME
exhaust plume during ascent on cameras E52, E222 and E224 (18:19:07.130,
18:19:10.526, 18:19:34.013, 18:19:40.805, and 18:19:44.5 through 18:19:44.7
UTC).
Body flap motion (less than usual) was seen during ascent (E207).
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ONBOARD PHOTOGRAPHY OF THE EXTERNAL TANK
2.5.1 Analysis of the Umbilical Well Camera Films
Two rolls of 16mm umbilical well film and one roll of 35mm umbilical well film
were received. The +X translation maneuver was performed on STS-90.
OV-102 does not provided timing data to the 16mm umbilical well cameras.
35mm Umbilical Well Camera Film
i" Z" i::.:.:::'..: :. "'..:: ,,- ..... .,
Figure 2.5.1 (A) Comparison of Pre-launch and Post-launch ET Nose
Photography
On the post-launch handheld photography, a gray-colored band of pock marked
or possible missing TPS is visible on the +Z ET nose just aft of the ET nose cone
fairing. The low Sun angle accentuates the rough appearance of the surface
texture on the photography. The gray-colored area is estimated to be
approximately 15 to 18 inches in length (fore and aft) and is visible across the
visible width of the ET nose. On the ET-91 pre-launch closeout photography,
the same area appears orange-colored with a smooth texture. Discoloration in
this area (probably due to aero heating) has been seen on several previous
mission post separation umbilical films. However, the roughness of the surface
texture seen on ET-91 appears unusual. Small popcorn divots from ascent are
visible on the ogive aft of the nosecone.
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Figure 2.5.1 (B) View of +Z ET Intertank Area
No damage to the visible portion (+Z/+Y) of the right SRB thrust panel was
noted on the 35mm umbilical well film (the left SRB thrust panel is not imaged).
A divot, approximately four to five inches in size, is visible under the ET/Orbiter
attach bipod in the LH2 tank-to-intertank closeout flange. A divot,
approximately three inches in size, is visible in the -Y direction from the forward
bipod on the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout. A small divot is visible in an
aft intertank stringer head forward of the LH2 tank-to-intertank closeout flange
in the +Y direction from the LO2 feedline. A possible three inch divot is visible
in the LH2 tank TPS aft of the right leg of the forward bipod next to the -Y side
of the LO2 feedline. Dark-colored linear-shaped marks, possibly from shock
waves off the EB fittings, were visible extending across the intertank stringer
heads.
Typical TPS erosion/divots were noted on vertical section of the LO2 electric
cable tray and on the aft portion of the +Z side of the LH2 tank. Chipping of the
TPS on the aft two LO2 feedline flanges were noted. A divot in the TPS on the
+Y ET/Orbiter aft thrust strut was noted. No anomalies were noted on the face
of the LO2 umbilical carrier plate.
16mm Umbilical Well Camera Film
The LSRB separation appeared normal on the 16mm umbilical well camera
films. Numerous light-colored pieces of debris (insulation and frozen hydrogen),
and dark debris (probably charred insulation) were seen throughout the SRB
separation film sequence. Typical ablation and charring of the ET/Orbiter LH2
umbilical electric cable tray and the aft surface of the -Y upper strut fairing prior
to SRB separation were seen. Numerous irregularly-shaped pieces of debris
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(charred insulation) were noted near the base of the LSRB electric cable tray
prior to SRB separation. A piece of TPS was seen to detach from the aft surface
of the horizontal section of the -YET vertical strut leaving a divot with exposed
substrate. Normal blistering of the fire barrier material on the outboard side of
the LH2 umbilical was seen. Ablation of the TPS on the aft dome was normal.
Both the left and right SRB nose caps were visible during SRB separation.
The ET separation from the Orbiter appeared normal. Numerous light colored
pieces of debris (probably insulation and frozen hydrogen) were seen throughout
the ET separation sequence on the 16mm films. Vapor and multiple light colored
pieces of debris were seen after the umbilical separation. White debris (frozen
hydrogen) were seen striking the forward surface of the LH2 electric cable tray.
No damage to the cable tray was detected.
No anomalies were noted on the face of the LH2 umbilical after ET separation
(the view of the LH2 umbilical interface is very dark due to back-lighting from
the Sun). As typically seen on previous missions, frozen hydrogen is visible on
the orifice of the LH2 17 inch connect.
A divot is visible under the ET/Orbiter attach bipod in the LH2 tank-to-intertank
closeout flange. Three divots are visible in the same flange closeout in the -Y/+Z
quadrant.
2.5.2 Analysis of the Handheld Photography of the ET
Thirty-eight images of the ET were acquired using the handheld 35mm Nikon
camera with a 400mm lens (roll 367). The exposure and focus of the
photography is good. Views of the sides, nose, and aft dome of the ET were
acquired. Venting from the ET in the vicinity of the intertank was observed.
The normal SRB separation burn scars and aero-heating marks were noted on the
ET TPS.
The ET was estimated to be about 1.4 km from the Orbiter on the first picture.
The minimum resolvable object size on the ET was estimated to be
approximately three inches on the best view. Back lighting from the Sun
hindered the analysis of some views. Timing data is present on the first four
frames of the film. No timing was present on the remaining frames. The first
picture was taken at 14:30 (minutes:seconds) MET. The astronauts performed a
manual pitch maneuver from the heads-up position to bring the ET into view in
the Orbiter overhead windows (STS-90 was the third flight with the roll-to-
heads-up maneuver).
2.5.2.1 Analysis of the Handheld Film
Damage to the external tank, including both intertank thrust panels, was not
confirmed from the available hand held camera views. Damage was seen on the
-Y LH2 tank-to-intertank close-out flange (frame 4). The damage appears as
three small light-colored marks (divots) approximately six to nine inches in size
(divots on this flange are a typical occurrence). The light-colored mark on the
LH2 tank TPS aft of the +Y thrust panel is visible on the pre-launch closeout
photography and is not damage. The light-colored appearance of the ET
intertank access door on frame 24 was caused by reflected Sun light and is not
anomalous.
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Figure 2.5.2.1 (A) ET +Y Intertank Thrust Panel
Figure 2.5.2.1 (B) ET -Y Intertank Thrust Panel
i i
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No damage was confirmed on the views of ET Thrust panels.
2.5.2.2 Analysis of the Camcorder Video of the ET
.!i!?i!:!?!:i!!_i!i!):i:.i. i
Figure 2.5.2.2 ET Intertank Venting
Approximately twelve minutes of downlink video of the STS-90 external tank
(ET) was received. No anomalies to the ET were confirmed during the screening
of the video. Venting was clearly visible from both the ET intertank vent area
and the aft ET/Orbiter umbilical attach areas. The venting in the region of the
ET intertank vent was visible for twenty seconds. Approximately six minutes
later, a three second period of venting was seen coming from what appeared to
be the LO2 ET/Orbiter umbilical. After three more minutes, a 170 second period
of venting was visible originating from the LH2 umbilical. The tumbling motion
of the ET did not appear excessive. The ET rate of tumble, i.e., the end-to-end
rotation of the ET about its center of mass, at the beginning of the video
sequence was estimated to be approximately three degrees/second. The rate of
roll about the ET X axis appeared to increase after the intertank venting began.
As noted on the two previous roll-to-heads-up flights, debris (probably ice) were
visible during the video sequence.
STS-90 JSC Summary Report A 14
2.0
i
2.6
Summary of Significant Events
LANDING EVENTS
2.6.1 Landing Sink Rate Analysis
Film camera EL-9 was used to determine the landing sink rate of the STS-90
Orbiter main gear. In the analysis, data from approximately one second of
imagery immediately prior to touchdown was considered. Data points defining
the main gear struts were collected on every frame (100 frames during the last
second prior to touch down). An assumption was made that the line of sight of
the camera was perpendicular to the Orbiter's y-axis. The distance between the
main gear struts was used as a scaling factor. The main gear height above the
runway was calculated by the vertical difference between the main gear struts
and the reference point. These heights were then regressed with respect to time
and the trendline was determined. Sink rate equals the slope of this regression
line.
The left main gear sink rate for STS-90 landing at one second, at half a second,
and at a one quarter of a second are provided in the following table. A plot
describing these sinkrates is also provided.
Time Prior to Touchdown 1.00 Sec. 0.50 See. 0.25 Sec.
Left Main Gear Sink Rate
Estimated Error (1_)
6.3 ft/sec 6.5 ft/sec 6.7 ft/sec
+ 0.2 ft/sec + 0.2 ft/sec + 0.1 ft/sec
Table 2.6.1 Main Gear Landing Sink Rate
The maximum allowable main gear sink rate values are 9.6 ft/sec for a 212,000
lb. vehicle and 6.0 ft/sec for a 240,000 lb. vehicle. The landing weight of the
STS-90 vehicle was estimated to be 232,965 lb.
ii
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STS-90 Main Gear Landing Sink Rate
(Camera EL-9)
_6
_5
I.
4
3
2
6.3 ft/sec (÷/- 0,2)
6.5 fl!sec (+/- 0.2_
6.7 f_/sec (÷/- 0.1)
0
- 1 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1
Time relative to main gear touchdown (seconds)
_.height .............. trend l.Os ...... trend 0.5s ....... trend 0.25s
Figure 2.6.1 Main Gear Landing Sink Rate
A sink rate analysis of the nose gear was not performed on STS-90 due to
budgetary constraints.
2.7 OTHER
2.7.1 Normal Events
Normal events observed included inboard elevon and body flap motion prior to
liftoff, RCS paper debris, ET twang, vapor from the ET vent louver at liftoff, ice
and vapor from the LO2 and LH2 TSM T-0 umbilical prior to and after
disconnect, multiple pieces of ET/Orbiter umbilical ice debris falling along the
body flap were during liftoff, expansion waves after liftoff, vapor off the SRB
stiffener rings, charring of the ET aft dome, condensation around the launch
vehicle, and SRB separation.
2.7.2 Normal Pad Events
Normal pad events observed included the Hydrogen burn ignitor operation; the
FSS deluge water activation; the MLP deluge water activation; and the TSM T-0
umbilical operations.
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Introduction
The launch of space shuttle mission STS-90, the 25th flight of the Orbiter Columbia occurred on April
17, 1998 at approximately 1:19 P.M. Central Standard Time (CST) from Launch Complex 39B
(LC-39B), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. Launch time was reported as 107:18:18:59.998
Universal Coordinated Time (UTC) by the MSFC Flight Evaluation Team. Photographic and video
coverage has been evaluated to determine proper operation of the flight hardware. Video and high-speed
film cameras providing this coverage are located on the fixed service structure (FSS), mobile launch
platform (MLP), LC-39B perimeter sites, Eastern Test Range tracking sites and onboard the vehicle.
Engineering Analysis Objectives
The planned engineering photographic and video analysis objectives for STS-90 include, but are not
limited to the following:
Verification of cameras, lighting and timing systems.
Overall propulsion system coverage for anomaly detection and structural integrity.
Determination of SRB PIC firing time and SRB separation time.
Verification of SRB and ET Thermal Protection System (TPS) integrity.
Correct operation of the following:
o SSME ignition and mainstage
o SRB debris containment system
o LH2 and LO2 17-inch disconnects
o Ground umbilical carrier plate (GUCP)
B1
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o Free hydrogen ignitors
o Booster separation motors (BSM)
Camera Coverage Assessment
The following table illustrates the camera coverage received at MSFC for STS-90.
16mm
lOnboard
35mm 70mm !Video
2
!MLP 19 0 h 0 [ 4
IFSS 5 0 I 0 _ 3
[Perimeter 0 3 0 6
,:Tracking 0 14 0 11
2 1
19
0
0iTotals 26 25
Total number of film and videos received: 70
Individual camera assessments are provided in Appendix A.
Ground Camera Coverage
No problems occurred with the KSC camera systems. Clear skies and the mid-day sun provided for
good photographic conditions.
Onboard Camera Coverage
The orbiter Columbia carried two 16ram motion picture cameras and a 35mm still camera in the
umbilical wells to record the SRB and ET separation events. The astronauts also photographed the ET
with a hand held 35ram camera and camcorder after separation.
Anomalies
No anomalies were noted.
Observations
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The typical observations noted on most missions were also noted during this
review. The thermal curtains on both SRB's momentarily buckled inward at liftoff.
The curtains do not typically buckle inward, but the outer surface has been
observed to wrinkle.
• .;.._i3!!!i;_-)_::!i::!:?!!il;:;;_#
The photographic products from the astronaut photography
of the ET shows that the thrust panels TPS remained in
good condition during ascent. Good views of both thrust
panels were made.
Typical divots where observed near the forward bipod strut,
the LH2 tank/intertank interface and on the right ET/Orbiter
thrust strut. These photographs were recorded with the
35mm umbilical well camera.
Venting of gasses from the ET GUCP and the LH2 and LO2
umbilicals was noted from the camcorder video. Venting was
first observed from the GUCP region and later venting from the
umbilicals was observed. Venting from the GUCP and LH2
umbilical has been previously observed on STS-45 and
STS-87.
Engineering Data Results
T-Zero Times
T-Zero times are determined from cameras that view the SRB holddown posts numbers M-1, M-2, M-5,
and M-6. These cameras record the explosive bolt combustion products.
Hoiddown Post CameraPosifion Time (UTC)
............. M21 ............. ......... E9 ....... 18ii8i59.995
................M-_2 ............ .......... E8 .......... i8:i8i59.998
..............M-5 ............ ........... Ei2 .... 18ii8i59.997
,...... M-6 ............... El3 ...... i8:i8i59'997
SRB Separation Time
SRB separation as recorded by observations of the BSM combustion products from long range film
cameras E212 and E208 occurred at 107:18:21:05.09 UTC.
A__t!pendix A - Individual camera assessments
A__ppendix B - Definitions and acronyms
Individua_ _m/video summary report
Return to Engineering Photographic Analysis Reports
Return to MSFC Engineering Photographic Analysis Home Page
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